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1. Introduction 
Many see concerns with minority rights and all human rights as a revolutionary 
development in international politics (Damrosch 1993: 93). One scholar avers that “the 
international law of human rights is revolutionary because it contradicts the notion of 
national sovereignty that is, that a state can do as it pleases in its own jurisdiction” 
(Forsythe 1983: 4). Another observes that international law has indeed “broken through 
the armour of sovereignty” (Hailbronner 1992: 117).  
We argue that this perspective is myopic both empirically and analytically. Empirically, 
the view that international concerns for minority rights represent an important change in 
the international system ignores the historical persistence of international involvement 
in the treatment of minorities within states. Relations between rulers and ruled have 
been an enduring concern across borders as well as within them. Every major peace 
treaty from Westphalia to Versailles contained provisions for the protection of 
minorities, defined in terms of religious affiliation and later linguistic and ethnic identity. 
With the end of the Cold War international concerns with minority rights have again 
become a focus of international concern after having been displaced by human rights 
in the post second world war period. 
Analytically, those who see a fundamental change in the international system 
misconstrue the extent to which the Westphalian model, which stipulates that states 
have exclusive authority within their own territory, fails to provide an adequate 
ontological construct or explanation for the behavior of rulers. In an anarchic 
environment rulers always have the option of compromising their own autonomy or 
intervening in the internal affairs of other states. The principle of non-intervention, 
which along with territoriality defines the Westphalian model, has persistently been 
challenged by alternative principles, including the international protection of miniority or 
human rights. Power and interest, not just principled beliefs have determined actual 
outcomes. 
The success of international efforts to protect minority rights has varied. Imposition or 
coercion, which involves situations in which rulers in stronger states force rulers in 
weaker ones to accept provisions for the acceptance of minority rights have failed. 
Contracts and conventions, in which rulers enter into international agreements 
designed to reinforce domestic commitments to the protection of minority rights, have 
been more successful. International efforts can succeed but only if they strengthen the 
position of domestic actors within target states who are themselves committed, for 
reasons of interest or principle, to the protection of minority rights. 
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1.1 The Westphalian Model 
The Westphalian model posits an order based on territory and in which relations 
between rulers and ruled are not subject to any external authority. Actors within the 
territorial boundaries of a state can structure their own relationships independent of 
outside forces. They may enshrine civil liberties in their constitutional practices or 
ignore them; they may recognize rights for minority cultures or suppress them; they 
may provide symmetrical treatment regardless of gender or treat men and women in 
fundamentally different ways; they may legitimate slavery or prohibit it. 
The Westphalian model does not provide an accurate description of the relationship 
between rulers and ruled in many polities. External actors have been concerned about 
the treatment of groups and individuals. Rulers within a state have sought external 
support for their domestic policies.  
Compared with many domestic polities the international system is weakly 
institutionalized. A variety of often mutually inconsistent principles have been used to 
legitimate policy. There has been no enduring consensus on how to balance minority 
rights concerns against demands for sovereign autonomy. There has been no authority 
that could prevent rulers from signing agreements, by choice or duress, which alter 
their relationship with their own subjects. The mechanisms that can reinforce 
institutional arrangements in well established domestic polities such as socialization, 
path dependence, and some pressures for institutional isomorphism have only the 
most feeble effect at the international level. (Such processes for embedding institutions 
have only the most limited impact in weak and fragmented domestic polities, Zaire for 
example, as well.) 
The Westphalian model has been compromised through four different modalities: 
conventions, contracts, coercion, and imposition.  
Conventions are international agreements in which rulers commit themselves to certain 
practices with regard to their own subjects, such as ethnic minorities, but their behavior 
is not contingent on what other signatories do. International and regional human-rights 
conventions are the most obvious example.  
Contracts are agreements in which rulers commit themselves to certain domestic 
policies contingent on the behavior of other rulers. Rulers have often honored minority-
rights guarantees because they feared that violations would lead other rulers to harm 
co-ethnics or co-religionists resident within the borders of the other state. Both 
conventions and contracts are Pareto-improving. Rulers only enter into them if they 
benefit from them in some way. The status quo ante remains an option. Conventions 
and contracts are both consistent with the international law conception of sovereignty 
which simply stipulates that a state is recognized and that its rulers have the right to 
enter into international agreements. Both conventions and contracts, however, can 
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compromise the Westphalian model of sovereignty by limiting the domestic autonomy 
of signatory states by creating authority structures that are outside the territorial 
boundaries of the state. 
Coercion involves situations in which the rulers in one state threaten those in others. 
The rulers of the target state are worse off. The status quo ante is no longer available. 
They have the option of either complying with the preferences of the initiator or 
suffering the consequences of sanctions. The sanctions imposed on South Africa to 
induce its rulers to end apartheid are an example of coercion. 
Finally, imposition occurs when the rulers or would-be rulers of a state have no option 
but to accept the preferences of more powerful states. The minority-rights treaties 
imposed on a number of the newly created states after the first world war are an 
example of imposition. The prospective rulers had no choice: they could not rule 
without accepting the conditions imposed on them. Imposition against already 
established states violates not only the Westphalian conception of sovereignty but the 
traditional international law conceptions as well because rulers cannot make 
independent judgments about whether or not they should enter into an agreement. 
Minority rights involve specific commitments by rulers or governments concerning the 
treatment of minority groups and/or individuals who belong to such groups. Minorities 
have been defined in many different ways, although religion and ethnicity have been 
the most prominent; the common thread is that the individual’s identity is linked to 
group membership and is distinct from the identity embraced by other individuals within 
a given polity.  
Extensive minority-rights guarantees have most often been coerced or imposed. Rulers 
in more powerful states have threatened or forced rulers or would-be rulers in weaker 
ones to treat minorities in specific ways for a variety of reasons including concerns 
about international stability, the balance of power, nationalism, and conceptions of 
appropriate state behavior. In some cases minority-rights guarantees have been the 
result of contracting. This has occurred where two states have had symmetrical 
interests in the treatment of minorities within their borders. There are also a few 
examples of minority rights agreements that are conventions which rulers have entered 
into because they wanted international reinforcement of their domestic preferences. 
Efforts to redefine relations between rulers and ruled have had limited success. 
Coercion and imposition have frequently failed because of asymmetries in the timing of 
the deployment of different resources. Targets accept minority rights at a particular 
moment in time because they are pressured by more powerful states. The promise of 
international recognition, in particular, has been used to encourage the would-be rulers 
of new states to accept provisions for minority rights. The problem is that once 
recognition is extended it is difficult to withdraw. If threats to impose sanctions or even 
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destroy the target state lose their credibility over time, the rulers of the target state will 
abandon their minority rights commitments. 
Minority-rights contracting among rulers has been more successful because such 
arrangements have typically involved commitments by one state to respect the rights of 
its minorities provided that the other party makes corresponding concessions. If one 
state violates its guarantees then the other will do the same and, because both parties 
know this, they are more likely to honor their contractual obligations. 
The success of conventions in influencing relations between rulers and ruled in 
signatory states has depended primarily on the way in which such arrangements alter 
or reinforce domestic attitudes (Moravcsik 1994). Conventions have been most 
consequential when they have been reinforced by domestic actors whose position can, 
in turn, be strengthened by the convention. Rulers may make international 
commitments to treat individuals or groups in specific ways because these 
commitments conform with their own preferences. They anticipate that a convention 
will reinforce these preferences by constraining the behavior of their successors 
because repudiating the commitment would send a costly signal. Conventions can also 
support minority rights by legitimating protests from other signatories or transnational 
groups, providing monitoring provisions that would make it more difficult for subsequent 
rulers to surreptitiously violate guarantees, and establishing judicial procedures which 
give non-state actors, including individuals, standing to bring complaints against their 
own government. 
 
1.2 Christians in the Ottoman Empire 
Attempts to influence the treatment of minority groups in other realms have been an 
enduring characteristic of international relations. For Western Christendom, the first 
target of such efforts was the Ottoman (Osmanli) Empire. European rulers made 
unilateral pledges to protect Christians as early as the 13th century. Numerous treaties 
were concluded between the Ottoman Porte and European states beginning in the 16th 
century.  
A number of European powers made unilateral commitments to protect Christians in 
parts of the Islamic world. Pledges by French monarchs dating back as far as the 13th 
century were reaffirmed for instance by Louis XIV in the 17th century. In 1535 
Suleiman the Magnificent signed a treaty with Francis I of France which provided that 
foreigners were to be judged by the laws of their home countries in consular courts, 
that foreigners were not subject to Ottoman taxation, and that customs duties on 
foreign goods would be limited. These treaties were not the result of coercion; the 
Ottoman Empire was at the height of its power. Rather, they were conventions that 
were consistent with the organization of political life within the Ottoman Empire where 
the millet system gave religious communities considerable control over their own 
affairs.  
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As the Ottoman Empire weakened, however, the major European powers used 
coercion to secure rights for resident Christians. Several treaties were designed to 
force the Sultan to act in conformity with Ottoman law and the millet system. In 1673 
France secured concessions for the Jesuits and Capuchins. The Treaty of Karlowitz of 
1699 gave the Polish ambassador the power to raise issues concerning the treatment 
of Catholics with the Sultan, and gave Austria the right to intervene on behalf of 
Catholics, a right that was renewed in 1718, 1739, and 1791. The Treaty of Kutchuk-
Kainardju (1774) gave the Russian ambassador standing to represent all Christians. 
European monarchs used these powers cynically, protecting their co religionists only 
when it served other political purposes. The pretense for intervention which these 
treaties gave the European powers increased instability in the Ottoman Empire 
(Macartney 1934: 161-163; Laponce 1960: 25; Blaisdell 1929: 24; Mansfield 1991: 80). 
In dealing with the Ottoman Empire, the rulers of the major European powers never 
accepted the principle of autonomy. Initially, when Europe was weak and the Ottoman 
Empire strong, they could do little more than offer often empty pledges to protect their 
co-religionists. Later, they signed conventions that validated Ottoman law. As the Porte 
weakened, however, the European powers engaged in coercion, securing treaties 
which affirmed their right to protect Christians within the Empire. 
2. Religious Toleration in Early Modern Europe 
Every major peace treaty in Europe from Westphalia in 1648 (and even Augsburg in 
1555) to the Congress of Vienna contained provisions for the treatment of religious 
minorities. These settlements among the major powers were contracts. They violated 
the principle of autonomy to reinforce domestic and international stability. 
The development of religious toleration and later religious freedom was a triumph of 
European civilization which evolved out of both principled arguments about the 
illegitimacy of coerced beliefs and a recognition that religious strife could lead to an 
Hobbesian state of nature. Although the extent of repression varied, the persecution of 
religious minorities or heretics had been a part of Christianity.1  
The civil strife of the 16th and 17th centuries led some European rulers to accept 
religious toleration. The Reformation ended any hope for unity in the Christian Church. 
                     
1 The persecution of non-Christians and heretics characterized Christianity from its adoption by 
Constantine as a universal state religion through the early modern period. The Roman 
emperor Theodosius imposed the death penalty on a heretic in the fourth century. Saint 
Augustine endorsed persecution designed to open the mind of those who had embraced error 
though he rejected the death penalty. Catholic intolerance included the persecution of Jews, 
heretics, and accused witches. Protestant state churches became intolerant as well: Luther 
and Calvin were interested in truth not tolerance, and Calvin banished those who did not 
subscribe to his beliefs from Geneva.(Bainton 1951, 26, 38-53; Jordan 1932, 31). 
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By 1600 it was evident from experiences in France and the Netherlands that heretical 
beliefs could not easily be suppressed by the sword; the alternatives for rulers were 
civil strife or some toleration. France was wracked by religious wars in the 16th century. 
The English Civil war destroyed the Stuart dynasty and even, for a time, monarchical 
rule. Germany was devastated by the Thirty Years War which resulted in as much as a 
loss of 40 percent of the rural population and 30 percent of the urban (Beller 1970: 
345-46, 357; Jordan 1932: 19-25, 38). 
Principled beliefs reinforced the sorry lessons derived from religious wars. It had long 
been an accepted tenet of Christian thought that true belief could not be coerced 
although what constituted coercion (including what level of torture) had always been 
contested. Even before the outbreak of the religious wars in France, the first of which 
began in 1562, many educated Frenchmen had concluded that religious toleration was 
necessary not simply for political reasons but also for moral ones as well. At the 
beginning of the 16th century Postel had argued that all the major religions of the world 
were based on a common universal truth. Bodin endorsed religious toleration in the Six 
Book of the Commonwealth published in 1576. Locke stated in his 1689 Letter 
Concerning Toleration that “neither Pagan nor Mahometan, nor Jew, ought to be 
excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of his religion.” (Jordan 
1932: 42; Skinner 1978: 244-54; Lewis 1992: 49).  
Religious toleration involved international agreements as well as changes in domestic 
policy. The Peace of Augsburg of 1555 endorsed the principle that the prince could set 
the religion of his territory (cuius regio, eius religio), hardly an endorsement of toleration 
for religious minorities but an explicit break with the medieval world which presumed a 
unified Christendom. Augsburg meant international acceptance for Catholic, Lutheran, 
and later Calvinist rulers. Augsburg reflected the view that domestic religious unity was 
necessary for the state but that state religions might differ. Cuius regio, eius religio is 
entirely consistent with the Westphalian model.  
The Augsburg settlement also, however, made some provisions for religious toleration, 
contradicting the principle of territorial autonomy. Rulers did not have unlimited rights 
over religious practices: at a minimum dissenters were not to be executed but rather 
were to be allowed to emigrate. While the state could regulate public worship, it could 
not generally intervene in private practices. In eight imperial cities of the Holy Roman 
Empire inhabited by both Lutherans and Catholics both faiths were given the right to 
co-exist. The rulers of ecclesiastical states could not change the religion of their 
domains. The Habsburg ruler Ferdinand I also promised, in a secret agreement not 
formally part of the Peace, that Lutheran nobles and townspeople living in 
ecclesiastical territories could continue to practice their faith. Augsburg, however, failed 
to secure religious peace and political stability in Europe (Scribner 1990: 195-97; 
Gagliardo 1991: 16-21; Jordan 1932: 36-37; Little 1993: 324-5). 
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The Peace of Westphalia had more extensive provisions for religious toleration. In this, 
and in other ways, the Peace of Westphalian (which consisted of the separate treaties 
of Münster and Osnabrück) violated the Westphalian model; it did not endorse the 
principle of domestic autonomy. While rhetorically embracing cuius religio eius religio 
many specific articles provided for religious toleration if not religious freedom in 
Germany. Catholic orders were to stay Catholic; Lutheran orders were to stay Lutheran 
(T. of OsnabrückV.11-V.23). Catholics who lived in Lutheran states or Lutherans who 
lived in Catholic states were to be given the right to practice their religions in the 
privacy of their homes, to educate their children at home or to send them to foreign 
schools. Subjects were not to be excluded from the “Community of Merchants, Artizans 
or Companies, nor deprived of Successions, Legacies, Hospitals, Lazar-Houses, or 
Alms-Houses, and other Privileges or Rights...” because of their religion. Subjects were 
not to be denied the right of burial nor were they to be charged an amount for burial 
different from that levied on those of the state religion (T. of Osnabrück, V. 28). 
Dissenters (Catholic or Lutheran) who did not have any rights of religious practice in 
1624 and who sought or were ordered to move were to have the freedom to do so and 
were given five years to sell their goods (T. of Osnabrück, V. 29-30). 
Catholics and Lutherans in specific mixed cities (Augsburg, Dunckelspiel, Biberach, 
Ravensburg, Kauffbeur) were to have freedom of religious practices (T. of Osnabrück, 
V. 25). In the first four of these cities, offices were to be divided equally between 
Catholics and Lutherans (T. of Osnabrück, V. 7) Members of the Silesian nobility who 
were Lutherans were granted by the Emperor the right to continue to practice their 
religion provided that they “do not disturb the public Peace and Tranquillity,...” They 
were also given the right to build three churches. (T. of Osnabrück, V. 31). Magistrates 
of either religion were admonished to forbid any person from criticizing or impugning 
the religious settlement contained in the agreement and in the earlier Treaty of Passau 
(T. of Osnabrück, V.41).  
Catholics and Lutherans were to be equally represented in imperial assemblies, and 
religious issues were to be decided by consensus (T. of Osnabrück, V. 42). 
Representatives to the imperial courts were to be divided by religion. If the judges of 
the two religions voted uniformly against each other in a case, the case could be 
appealed to the Diet. If there were cross-cutting cleavages with respect to religion then 
a case could not be appealed (T. of Osnabrück, V. 45). Rights given to Lutherans and 
Catholics were extended to Calvinists (T. of Osnabrück, VII). 
Where the religion of a ruler changed from one Protestant sect to another (e.g., from 
Lutheran to Calvinist), the ruler was to have the right of worship of his own religion, but 
he was prohibited from attempting to change the religion of his subjects or churches, 
hospitals, schools, and revenues. The new ruler was enjoined from giving “any trouble 
or molestation to the Religion of others directly or indirectly” (T. of Osnabrück, VII,240). 
The community was given the right to name ministers, and the Prince was to confirm 
them “without denial” (T. of Osnabrück, VII, 240).  
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The terms of toleration were shaped by the interests of the rulers of the major powers, 
the Habsburgs, the King of France, and the King of Sweden. The Holy Roman 
Emperor, Ferdinand III, endorsed religious toleration within Germany as part of a 
general settlement of a devastating war, but refused to accept it in other Habsburg 
lands. Austria, ruled by the Habsburgs but not part of the Empire, was not included. 
Toleration was limited to Lutherans, Calvinists, and Catholics (T. of Osnabrück, VII). 
The rulers of France refused to accept any provisions for religious toleration. 
The Peace of Westphalia was a major step in ending religious strife but there were 
conflicts over implementation and attempts to defect unilaterally. The Westphalia 
clauses were put into effect beginning in the winter of 1648-49 (Gagliardo 1991: 83-85), 
but there was tension over their implementation particularly in the free cities (Hughes 
1992: 134).2 Those states which could sidestep the terms of Westphalia did so. While 
tolerating Protestants in such outlying areas as Silesia and Hungary, the Habsburgs 
expelled them from Styria and Upper Austria while resettling many in Transylvania “for 
state economic reasons” (Gagliardo 1991: 178). The Habsburgs refused to abide by 
some provisions for the repatriation and restitution of Protestants, and expulsion of 
dissidents whose situation was not explictly protected (Holborn 1959: 370). The 
archbishop of Salzburg expelled Protestants in 1731. Such actions were typically 
followed by reprisals against Catholics in the Protestant Northern states. Calvinists and 
Lutherans also clashed in such states as Saxony and Brandenburg-Prussia. 
Toleration was not generally viewed as a desirable policy. Rather, it was accepted in 
specific areas as a matter of political necessity. The ecclesiastical boundaries set by 
the treaty remained more-or-less intact until as late as 1945. After 1648, there was a 
slow but general abatement of religious conflict. Yet this may have been due primarily 
to the fact that the states were more homogenous in 1648 than in earlier years and to 
the relatively few religious conversions of princes after Westphalia (Holborn 1959: 370-
371; Gagliardo 1991: 177-188; Hughes 1992: 134-136). Only slowly did the principle of 
toleration implied in the Peace of Westphalia come to prevail in western Europe.  
After 1648, it was customary for a sovereign taking over a territory to pledge respect for 
existing religious rights within that territory. The treaties of Oliva (1650), Nijmegen 
(1678), Breslau (1742), Dresden (1745), Hubertusburg (1763), and Warsaw (1772) all 
had such provisions. The Treaty of Utrecht of 1731, in which France ceded Hudson 
Bay and Arcadia to Britain, provided that the Roman Catholic subjects of these areas 
were entitled to practice their faith “insofar as the laws of England permit it” (quoted in 
                     
2 The Westphalian simultaneum system, which gave corporate status to two or all three 
recognized faiths in specific divided areas, was continually challenged and maintained only 
by a tense balance of threats. For instance, the 1697 Treaty of Ryswick allowed Catholics in 
the Palatinate to retain the privileges accorded to them by the occupying French, a threat to 
simultaneum. Intense conflict among the three religions ensued, until in 1718 the Elector of 
the Palatinate tore down the wall separating the Calvinist section of the Church of the Holy 
Spirit in Heidelberg and claimed the Church as his own. The Protestant and Catholic 
German states (and their allies) would have gone to war but for the intervention of the 
Emperor (story in Hughes 1992,134-136). 
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Laponce 1960: 24). A similar provision was included in the Treaty of Paris of 1763 in 
which the King of Great Britain again agreed that Catholic subjects in Canada would be 
entitled to the same rights as those in Britain (Laponce 1960: 23-24; Macartney 1934: 
158-159). 
The settlement of the Napoleonic Wars included provisions for the protection of 
religious minorities in parts of Belgium assigned to Holland and in areas of Savoy 
ceded to Geneva. Belgian Catholics were to have liberty of conscience, equal access 
to administrative positions, and representation in political bodies. These provisions 
were to be written into the Dutch constitution and could not be changed by the people 
of Holland. Detailed measures for religious coexistence were also made for parts of 
Catholic Savoy ceded by the King of Sardinia to Calvinist Geneva.3  
The 1815 Vienna settlement included, for the first time, explicit protection for an ethno-
national minority. Article I of the Congress of Vienna Final Act called on Austria, 
Prussia, and Russia to provide Poles “a Representation and National Institutions... that 
each of the Governments to which they belong shall judge expedient and proper to 
grant them.” This provision reflected in part Castlereagh's view that Polish national 
sentiment could not be suppressed. The provisions of the Vienna accord related to 
Poles had only a limited impact.4  
In sum, religious toleration in Europe (and even at Vienna respect for an ethnic 
minority) was embodied in international agreements as well as domestic legislation and 
practices. Stipulations regarding the treatment of religious minorities were part of larger 
contractual agreements to end wars, particularly where territory was transferred among 
                     
3 Article 3 of the protocol of May 29, 1815 ceded parts of Savoy, which had been ruled by the 
King of Sardinia, to Geneva. The protocol stipulated that Catholics in the ceded territory 
would be able to continue their existing practices. In areas where the Catholic population 
exceeded the Protestant the schoolmasters would always be Catholic, no Protestant “temple” 
would ever be established except in the town of Carrouge where only one could be built 
(quoted in Laponce 1960, 26). The mayor and vice-mayor would always be Catholic. If the 
Protestant population grew and exceeded the Catholic one, then there would be rotation in 
office and a Catholic school would always exist even if a Protestant one were built. The new 
government would continue to provide, at the existing level, support for the maintenance of 
the clergy and religion. In these areas Protestants could worship privately and could privately 
hire Protestant schoolmasters. Catholics were to have equal civil and political rights. Catholic 
children were to be admitted to public education institutions but religious instruction would be 
conducted separately. The King of Sardinia could bring complaints to the Diet of the Helvetic 
federation (Laponce 1960, 26-27, 39; Macartney 1934, 158-59). 
4 Austria strictly forbade manifestations of political nationalism among the Polish (Macartney 
1934, 112). Russia did establish distinct institutions for ‘Congress Poland’ after 1815, 
including a separate constitution and parliament, but the 1830 revolt of Polish army cadets 
caused Nicholas I to end local autonomy. The French government protested, but the British, 
anxious to avoid enmity with Russia, refused to take any significant action (Fouques-Duparc, 
1922, 115, 122-26; Claude, 1955, 7; Laponce 1960, 28-29). The 1863 Warsaw Uprising 
precipitated more repression and more intense assimilative measures by Alexander II 
(Pearson 1983, 72-74). Prussia engaged in a Germanization campaigns after 1830 and 1848, 
and after 1867 excluded the Polish language altogether and expelled Russian Poles (Ibid, 
128-129; Janowsky 1945, 25-27). 
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rulers. Rulers made international commitments about how they would treat the religious 
practices of some their own subjects. In some cases foreign actors were recognized as 
having a legitimate right to monitor behavior and protest violations. In others, basic 
constitutional arrangements were specified. These conditions violated the very 
Westphalian model of sovereignty which these same treaties are said to have created.  
3. The Balkans in the 19th Century 
The Ottoman Empire unravelled during the 19th century andal of the successor states - 
Greece, Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, and Albania as well as the Ottoman 
Empire itself, accepted constraints on how minorities would be treated. Initially these 
constraints were formulated in terms of religious affiliation, but later ethnic groups were 
included as well.  
Unlike religious toleration in western Europe, minority protection in the Balkans was the 
result of coercion and imposition by the great powers. Power asymmetries, at least at 
the point of independence, were high. The rulers or would-be rulers of new states 
preferred complete autonomy with respect to the treatment of groups within their own 
borders. The rulers of the major powers, however, coerced or compelled them to make 
commitments regarding non-discrimination. Leaders in Britain, France, Russia, and 
Austria-Hungary were motivated primarily by concerns about international stability: 
religious and ethnic strife could destabilize polities in the Balkans and draw other states 
into conflicts that they would have preferred to avoid (World War I proved these 
anxieties all too prescient). There were other concerns as well, including the unwanted 
emigration generated by discriminatory policies. 
These efforts to protect minorities were not successful. Recognition, once extended, 
was costly to withdraw because it would have made it more difficult for the major 
powers to pursue their interests in the Balkans because they would have had no 
interloctutor with which to interact. After independence, the Balkan states became 
relatively more powerful. It became more costly for the major powers to coerce by 
making credible threats or to compel by using force. Monitoring was difficult. 
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Greece, the first state to become independent from the Ottoman Empire, a status 
secured only through the intervention of Britain, France, and Russia.5 By 1830, these 
states were committed to creating a formally independent Greek state, but there was 
never any thought that this entity would be a Westphalian state. The British wanted to 
avoid granting Russia naval access to the eastern Mediterranean and greater 
influence. Russian leaders did not have the military power to impose their own 
settlement. The Greek revolutionaries were themselves divided (Schwartzberg 1988: 
139, 301, 303; Temperly 1966: 406-08; Anderson 1966: 74-75; Dakin 1973: 289-90, 
310-12; Jelavich / Jelavich 1977: 50-52). 
The major powers insisted that religious toleration be included in Greek law. In 1830 
they signed a protocol which stated that to preserve Greece from “the calamities which 
the rivalries of the religions therein professed might excite, agree that all the subjects of 
the new State, whatever their religion may be, shall be admissible to all public 
employments, functions and honours, and be treated on a footing of perfect equality, 
without regard to difference of creed, in their relations, religious, civil or political” 
(quoted in Macartney 1934: 164-65). 
Toleration for minorities was included in all subsequent settlements for the Balkans. In 
the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which granted independence under Ottoman suzerainty to 
Wallachia and Moldavia (the two Ottoman provinces that were to become Romania), 
and a subsequent agreement in 1858, the western powers sought to guarantee equal 
treatment for all, including Jews. During the late 1860s leaders in both Britain and 
France protested against the treatment of Jews in Romania. In Britain, Lord Stanley 
argued that the treatment of Jews in Romania was an affair that touched Christian as 
well as Jews, because, “if the suffering falls on the Jews, the shame falls on the 
Christians” (quoted in Fouques-Duparc 1922: 102; translation by author). The British 
claimed the right to enforce Article 46 of the 1858 Paris treaty providing for political and 
economic equality for Jews under great power guarantee (Ibid., 98-106). The 
Romanian constitution of 1866, however, gave only Christians the right to apply for 
Romanian nationality. Romanian authorities ignored these protests and the vaguely 
worded treaty provisions. 
The Western powers sought in more limited terms to prod the Ottoman Porte towards 
increased toleration. In the months following the Crimean war, they pressured the 
Sultan to issue the firman (edict) of Hatti-Humayoun committing the Porte to 
administrative reform and to religious privileges for Christians (Blaisdell 1929: 25). In 
                     
5 The Greek revolt began in 1821. By 1827, the Ottomans, with the help of a fleet provided by 
Mehmet Ali (the quasi independent ruler of Egypt), were on the verge of suppressing the 
rebellion. A joint British, French, and Russian force destroyed Mehmet Ali’s fleet at the Battle 
of Navarino and the Ottoman army was then defeated, giving the Greeks the opportunity for 
military success. Greek independence was recognized in 1832. Greece was established as a 
monarchy; whereas most of the Greek revolutionaries would have preferred a republic. Otto, 
the underage second son of the King of Bavaria, was chosen as monarch because he did not 
have close ties with any of the major powers. Greece’s use of its own revenues was 
constrained by the terms of a loan from the major powers. 
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the 1856 Treaty of Paris, the Sultan affirmed this firman “emanating spontaneously 
from his Sovereign will”; however, in the same article, the European powers eschewed 
interference in its internal affairs to protect the Christian minority (article IX). Despite 
external pressure and the traditional millet system, which provided minority 
communities with some autonomy, the Ottoman Empire never resolved ethnic and 
religious conflicts in the Balkans.  
The efforts of the major powers to establish religious toleration in the Balkans reached 
their apogee at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, organized to settle the armed conflicts 
that began with a Christian revolt in Bosnia and to roll back advantages which Russia 
had secured in the 1878 Treaty of San Stefano which would have created a Bulgarian 
state dependent on Russia that had access to the Mediterrean.6 (Langer 1964: 138; 
Jelavich / Jelavich 1977: 143-153; Anderson 1966: 182). The Congress recognized 
Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania as independent states and Bulgaria as a tributary 
state of the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary, with British support, secured the right to 
occupy and administer Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Bazar although 
these areas formally remained part of the Ottoman Empire. 
As a condition of recognition, the major powers insisted that the new states grant 
political equality to all faiths. They stipulated that in Bulgaria, Montenegro, Serbia, and 
Romania, “...the difference of religious creeds and confessions shall not be alleged 
against any person as a ground for exclusion or incapacity in matters relating to the 
enjoyment of civil and political rights, admission to public employments, functions, and 
honours, or the exercise of the various professions and industries in any locality 
whatsoever. The freedom and outward exercise of all forms of worship shall be 
assured to all persons belonging to [name of state], as well as to foreigners, and no 
hindrance shall be offered either to the hierarchical organization of the different 
communions, or to their relations with their spiritual chiefs” (Articles V, XXVII, XXXV, 
and XLIV respectively). They secured similar language as a “spontaneous declaration” 
of the Ottoman Porte, with the additional provisions for the political organization of 
minority communities and the rights of foreigners: “The freedom and outward exercise 
of all forms of worship are assured to all, and no hindrance shall be offered either to 
the hierarchical organization of the various communions or to their relations with their 
spiritual chiefs. Ecclesiastics, pilgrims, and monks of all nationalities travelling in 
Turkey in Europe, or in Turkey in Asia, shall enjoy the same rights, advantages, and 
privileges.... The rights possessed by France are expressly reserved, and it is well 
                     
6 In 1875 Christians in Bosnia and Herzegovina revolted. The Austrian Foreign Minister, Count 
Andrassy, proposed to Turkey that the Porte grant religious liberty to the two provinces and 
abolish tax farming. Turkey agreed, but the central government was too weak to implement 
this accord and unrest continued. A revolt broke out the following year in Bulgaria and was 
suppressed. Serbia unsuccessfully attacked the Ottoman forces with Russian assistance; in 
1877, Russia intervened directly with the hope of creating a Bulgarian state with access to the 
Mediterranean that would be beholden to Russia, an outcome that was threatening to Britain. 
With the aid of Russia, the various Slavic groups in the Balkans defeated the Ottomans. 
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understood that no alterations can be made in the status quo in the Holy Places” 
(Article LXII).  
The Treaty of Berlin also included guarantees for an ethnic minority: the Porte agreed 
to implement local reforms in Armenian territories and to guarantee Armenian security 
against the Circassians and Kurds. Turkey was to inform the Powers of the steps it had 
taken and the powers would “superintend their application” (Article LXI). The Ottomans 
made this pledge to secure the withdrawal of Russian forces from Armenian territory 
(Mansfield 1991: 75, 81; Macartney 1934: 167). 
The minority provisions of the Treaty of Berlin were the result of coercion and 
imposition. The targets were not involved in drafting the Treaty. The would-be rulers of 
Romania, Bulgaria Montenegro, and Serbia were not, themselves, interested in 
religious toleration. They accepted these arrangements because it was the only way 
that they could secure recognition as independent or, in the case of Bulgaria tributary, 
states. The Ottoman Empire agreed to protect the Armenians only to secure the 
removal of Russian troops from its territory, an unambiguous example of compulsion.  
The major powers applied provisions for religious toleration primarily because they 
were concerned with international stability. The Balkans were a volatile area. Orthodox 
religious concerns had provided a pretext for Russian intervention and Russian 
intervention in the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire threatened British interests in the 
eastern Mediterranean. Austria-Hungary was fearful of ethnic nationalism prompting 
informal control of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878 and formal incorporation in 1907, 
although in or out, Slavic nationalism posed a threat to the political integrity of the 
Empire. Bismarck was anxious to maintain Germany’s alliance with Austria-Hungary 
and Russia, which could be, and ultimately was, destroyed by conflict in the Balkans. 
Humanitarian concerns and interest-group pressure were also influential. British public 
opinion was agitated by reports of Turkish atrocities against the Bulgarians. Jewish 
groups in the United States and Great Britain pressured their governments to protest 
Romanian treatment of Jews. Later in the century, American officials pressed Romania 
for reforms with the hope of limiting the flow of new Jewish emigrants (Macartney 1934: 
169, 281; Fouques-Duparc 1922: 112; Pearson 1983: 98). 
The treatment of Jews in Romania epitomizes the failure of intermittent major-power 
attempts to secure minority rights in the Balkans. After Berlin, recognition was only 
extended in February 1880 after Romanian officials had publicly declared that a Jew 
could become a citizen; in practice, policy hardly changed. While non-Christians could 
nominally obtain citizenship, it required an act of parliament for each individual Jew. Of 
the 269,000 Jews in Romania only 200 attained citizenship. Non-citizens had to pay for 
primary school and were excluded from professional schools in 1893, and secondary 
and higher education in 1898. Jews were prohibited from living in rural areas. By the 
1900s, almost 90% of Romanian émigrés to the US were Jewish, an indicator of 
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continued repression (Fouques-Duparc 1922: 98-112; Jelavich / Jelavich 1977: 178; 
Pearson 1983: 98).  
Nor did European states intervene with great vigor or success to prevent Ottoman 
atrocities against the Armenians. There were a number of massacres, the first of which 
took place in 1894. Despite protests from the western powers, including in 1909 the 
dispatch of two British warships to Messina, these depredations continued (Macartney 
1934: 167, 170).  
Unlike the development of religious liberty in western Europe, the effort to secure 
minority rights in the Balkans was not founded in domestic political coalitions. The 
would-be rulers of the new Balkan states would have preferred no restrictions on their 
treatment of religious minorities. Although the major powers did protest humanitarian 
catastrophes in the Balkans, they were unwilling to apply more economic or military 
pressure except where it suited their narrow strategic interests. 
4. The Versailles Settlement and Minority Rights 
International efforts to secure minority rights culminated in the Versailles settlement to 
the first world war. All of the new polities as well as established states whose 
boundaries were changed signed minority rights treaties or made unilateral pledges 
regarding minority rights.7 The rulers or would-be rulers of some states, notably 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia, regarded the minority rights treaties as pareto improving, 
but leaders of most of the others, especially those with large internal minorities 
including Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia, saw the treaties as a product of external 
coercion or imposition (Bartsch 1995: 84-85). Unlike earlier settlements, the Versailles 
arrangements provided for elaborate monitoring and enforcement through the League 
of Nations and the International Court of Justice. In the end the Versailles settlement 
failed, and not just because of the triumph of Nazism in Germany. 
The minority rights established after the first world war were set in treaties concluded 
by the Allied powers with Poland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, and 
Romania in 1919, with Hungary and Greece in 1920, and with Turkey in 1923; in 
declarations made as a condition for admission to the League for Albania in 1921, 
Lithuania in 1922, Latvia and Estonia in 1923, and Iraq in 1932; and through League 
guarantees for the treatment of minorities included in bilateral conventions concerning 
the Free City of Danzig and Upper Silesia (Poland/Germany, 1920 and 1922), the 
                     
7 Those states seen as major powers were not compelled to make corresponding treaty 
guarantees. Italy did not guarantee the rights of Germanspeakers in areas ceded by Austria 
(South Tyrol / Alto Adige). Germany only agreed to minority protection regimes in Upper 
Silesia and Danzig. 
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Åaland Islands (Sweden/Finland, 1921) and Memel Convention (Lithuania/Germany, 
1924) (Lerner 1993: 83; Claude 1955: 16; Jones 1991: 45).8  
The protections were detailed and elaborate. In the Polish minority treaty, the model 
(verbatim in most cases) for all the interwar minorities obligations, the Polish 
government undertook “to assure full and complete protection of life and liberty to all 
inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race or 
religion....Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Polish 
national in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance 
admission to public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of 
professions and industries” (Articles 1 and 7). Poland granted citizenship rights to 
individuals habitually resident in its territory or borne within its territory of parents 
habitually resident there (even if not presently in Poland), a provision that reflected 
concern about the aforementioned exclusion of Romanian Jews in earlier decades 
(Romania was forced to signed similar provisions after W.W.I). Minority-language 
schooling would be provided in areas with a considerable number of non-Polish 
speakers, although the teaching of Polish could be obligatory (Article 8). Jews could 
decline official duties which would violate the Sabbath and Polish leaders committed “to 
refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether general or local, to be held on a 
Saturday...” (Article 11, reprinted in Macartney 1934: 502-506; see also Sharp 1979: 
174; Fouques-Duparc 1922:112). 
Unlike earlier minority-rights guarantees, the Versailles arrangements had extensive 
provisions for monitoring and enforcement. In treaties with Poland, Austria, Bulgaria, 
and Czechoslovakia, minority protections were made basic constitutional law as well as 
international obligations. The treaties provided that the laws related to the treatment of 
minorities would not be changed without the approval of a majority of the League 
Council (Bilder 1992: 64; Laponce 1960: 40; Lerner 1993: 85).  
Monitoring and enforcement mechanisms were established within the League of 
Nations. Individuals as well as a state could petition the League secretariat. Petitions 
were considered by an ad hoc Minorities Committee comprised of the president of the 
Council and two appointed members (Veatch 1983). If the Committee could not resolve 
a complaint informally, it was placed on the Council's formal agenda and could be 
considered by a Committee of Jurists to determine if the state had violated its 
international obligations. The Committee could ask the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for an advisory opinion. Between 1921 and 1938 the League 
received 473 petitions. Poland was the most frequent target of complaint (203 petitions) 
                     
8 The bilateral minority-rights treaties varied in their provisions and the right of petition to the 
League Council (state-parties could petition in each case). An elaborate regime with regional 
enforcement machinery and appeal to the League was established for Upper Silesia based 
on the bilateral Geneva Convention of 15 May 1922 between Germany and Poland. Minority-
rights provisions applicable to Danzig were governed by a High Commissioner who could 
refer cases to the League; the local parliament of the Åaland Islands could direct complaints 
to the League. See Macartney 1934, chapter 7; Veatch 1983. 
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followed by Romania with 78 (Janowsky 1945: 117-121; Claude 1955: 20-28; Bartsch 
1995: 103-104).  
The enforcement procedures were not implemented vigorously. Some specific victories 
were pyrrhic. For instance, in one of the few cases to go through the entire procedure, 
the League was petitioned in 1921 concerning challenges to the property rights of 
some Germans who had settled in what became Poland after the first world war. The 
three member ad hoc Minorities Committee failed to secure an informal settlement and 
the case was referred to the League Council in 1922. The Poles rejected the Council’s 
request for restraint as well as the findings of a committee of jurists, and expelled the 
Germans. The Council referred the issue to the Permanent Court of International 
Justice which also ruled against Poland. The Poles refused to reverse the evictions but 
did finally agree to pay compensation of 2.7 million zlotys. In another case brought in 
1928 Russian peasants complained that their land was being unjustly taken by 
Lithuania. No one in the League was anxious to press the issue. The Lithuanian 
government stalled and the case was dropped a year and a half after it had been 
initiated (Janowsky 1945: 121-122; 125, n. 8). 
The provisions for the protection of minorities associated with the Versailles settlement 
and the League were justified in terms of established norms. Clemenceau maintained 
that the minority provisions of the peace treaties were consistent with diplomatic 
precedent in Europe. It is worth quoting at length from a note he sent conveying the 
treaty to Poland for signature, because it illustrates that the Westphalian norm of non-
intervention was not only not taken for granted but was also contradicted by other 
norms explicitly articulated by European rulers: “This Treaty does not constitute any 
fresh departure. It has for long been the established procedure of the public law of 
Europe that when a State is created, or even when large accessions of territory are 
made to an established State, the joint and formal recognition of the Major powers 
should be accompanied by the requirement that such States should, in the form of a 
binding international Convention, undertake to comply with certain principles of 
Government.... In this connection I must also recall to your consideration the fact that it 
is to the endeavours and sacrifices of the Powers in whose name I am addressing you 
that the Polish nation owes the recovery of its independence.... There, rests, therefore, 
upon these Powers an obligation, which they cannot evade, to secure in the most 
permanent and solemn form guarantees for certain essential rights which will afford to 
the inhabitants the necessary protection, whatever changes may take place in the 
internal constitution of the Polish State...” (quoted in Macartney 1934: 238).  
At Versailles, Woodrow Wilson championed a second rationale for the international 
protection of minority rights. Wilson’s vision of the new world order in 1918 was 
collective security: peace-loving states would join together to resist depredations by 
any aggressor. Only democratic states would make such commitments. The first 
guarantee of democracy was self-determination. Self-determination alone, however, 
could not resolve political tensions because in much of central Europe, ethno-national 
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populations were inextricably mingled. The treaties sought to resolve this problem by 
making minorities loyal citizens of the states in which they happened to live. If 
minorities were ill-treated, they could not only cause disorder within their countries of 
residence they could also threaten international peace if a patron state came to their 
assistance (Macartney 1934: 275, 278, 297). Wilson stated at the Paris Peace 
Conference that “Nothing, I venture to say, is more likely, to disturb the peace of the 
world than the treatment which might in certain circumstances be meted out to 
minorities. And therefore, if the major powers are to guarantee the peace of the world 
in any sense, is it unjust that they should be satisfied that the proper and necessary 
guarantees have been given?” (quoted in Sharp 1979: 175). Again, the norms of 
collective security contradicted the Westphalian norm of non-intervention. 
While the minority rights regime of the interwar period ultimately collapsed it was not 
totally without effect. The rights of minorities were protected in some countries during 
much of the inter-war period. The Baltic states, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia did 
conserve most of their minority populations and integrate them into civil society. 
Hungarian leaders were sympathetic to the minority rights regime because there were 
large Hungarian minorities outside of Hungary, and minorities comprised only 10 of the 
Hungarian population. A pacted multiethnic state from the start, Czechoslovak leaders 
embraced and implemented minority treaty provisions. Czech leaders also hoped that 
the Treaty would make pan-German appeals less attractive for the large German 
minority in Czechoslovakia. Public reaction was positive at least initially. Yet even in 
Czechoslovakia, some minorities did not fare well: commitments for an autonomous 
Carpathian region or for Slovak autonomy were never fully implemented, and 
Ruthenian peasants in Carpathia received developmental assistance primarily to 
undermine Magyar domination of the area. And even representatives of the relatively 
secure German minority in Bohemia (Sudetenland) did not prevent its representatives 
from complaining constantly to the League and eventually providing a pretext for the 
takeover of Czechoslovakia itself (Azcarate 1945: 40-42; Pearson 1983: 155; Bartsch 
1995: 81-83; Macartney 1934: 413-415; Robinson et al. 1943: 169).  
From the outset, rulers and would-be rulers from Romania, Poland and Yugoslavia 
protested the minority treaties. These leaders all confronted large minority populations 
within the borders of their state, while only a small percentage of their co-ethnics lived 
in other countries. Bratianu, the Romanian leader, argued at the peace conference that 
the minority treaty violated Romania's soverignty as well as the principle of sovereign 
equality, and that the possiblity of external intervention undermined internal stability. 
Disaffected rulers also pointed out that the regime was asymmetrical. The victors, 
especially the United States and Britain, accepted no standards for the treatment of the 
Welsh, Irish, African- and Asian-Americans, and other minorities within their own 
societies. Italy did not have to accept a treaty governing the German minority in newly 
acquired areas in the South Tyrol. The US along with New Zealand, Canada, and 
Australia blocked efforts by Japan to introduce a clause endorsing racial equality into 
the League Covenant (Macartney 1934: 252; Sharp 1979: 181-183; Sharp 1991: 61; 
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Janowsky 1945: 126-129; Claude 1955: 17, 32-33; Trachtenberg 1993: 27; Bilder 
1992: 65-66; Bartsch 1995: 75-76). 
Despite historical precedent, a clearly articulated rationale, and monitoring and 
enforcement procedures minorities did not fare well in the disaffected states. The 
experience of minority populations in Poland, whose minority treaty was a model for all 
others, was mixed at best (Gutman 1989:103-105; Pearson 1983: 188-189). The 
commitment not to schedule national elections on Saturday was honored (law of 28 
July 1923); however, many other Sabbath provisions and Jewish school committees 
were not implemented (Robinson et al. 1943: 237). Anti-Semitic pogroms and 
campaigns were at a minimum tolerated by public officials; complainants to the League 
were persecuted (ibid. 176). The emigration rate of Jews was five times that of Poles. 
The Eastern Slavic minorities, seen as a security threat, experienced some of the worst 
oppression. The Byelorussians were Polonized after 1924 including closures of 
schools, societies, and newspapers, and the establishment of a concentration camp at 
Beresa Kartuska, while Ruthenes (Ukrainians) were brutally attacked by the Polish 
military in 1930 (ibid., 162-164). The Polish government formally renounced its 
minority-rights guarantee in September 1934 “pending the introduction of a general and 
uniform system for the protection of minorities” (quoted in Janowsky 1945: 127 n. 11). 
Nazi Germany also renounced its obligations in 1934 and the League minorities system 
soon became defunct. 
In sum, the interwar experience of minority-rights guarantees epitomized the difficulty 
of coercing and even imposing minority-rights provisions upon states where these 
provisions have uncertain domestic foundations and international support. For 
intervention to succeed where the target continues to oppose it, the initiator must 
continue to gauge implementation and credibly threaten sanctions. Instead, the major 
powers went their separate ways, in particular the US which withdrew from the League, 
and France which saw its security in terms of alliances with the new East-European 
states against Germany and opposed efforts by other League Council members to hold 
these states hostage to their minority policies.  
In the inter-war settlement the Westphalian model did not constrain attempts to shape 
relations between rulers and ruled within territorial units. The victors defended 
democracy, self-determination, stability and collective security, even if this meant 
compromising autonomy. Though the Westphalian model was always a reference 
point, power and interests not principles determined outcomes. The allied powers were 
able to establish the minorities regime at the conclusion of World War I because they 
had military, economic and diplomatic resources. If weak states and proto-states 
wanted international recognition, they had to accept protection for minorities. Over 
time, however, the major powers were not prepared to commit the military or economic 
resources necessary to defend minority rights in states where it lacked a domestic 
political base of support, ultimately dooming the League minorities system to failure. 
 21
5. Minority Protection after 1945 
In the aftermath of World War II, the international protection of minorities was almost 
totally abandoned, a position made evident at Potsdam by the tacit acceptance of the 
uprooting of millions of Germans from eastern Europe especially areas ceded to 
Poland. These policies reflected the preferences of the superpowers and the general 
disillusionment with the interwar experience. Only a handful of specific agreements in 
Europe in the twenty years following W.W.II were concerned with minority rights. 
Instead, international concerns with relations between rulers and ruled focussed on 
individual human rights. 
There was general disillusionment with the minority protection because of the 
perceived failure of the League treaties and the discrediting of the national principle. 
The fascist interlude and the horrors of the Nazi Holocaust which had decimated two 
perpetual minorities in Europe, Jews and Roma (gypsies), had shown the failure of 
international monitoring and enforcement. Many thought minority group rights a 
dangerous principle, since the Nazi regime had used German-speaking minorities as a 
pretext for expansion (Alcock 1979a: 226-227). Thus the 1947 peace treaties with 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Italy, and Romania, along with the 1955 Austrian State Treaty, 
included strong prohibitions of discrimination but no provision for members of 
aggrieved groups to seek redress.9 
The US emerged from World War II as the dominant state in the international system, 
powerful enough to project its values on the post-war order. Minority rights were not 
part of the American political heritage. A nation of immigrants, American identity was 
based on political beliefs not ascriptive ties. The governing ideology was grounded in 
the mutual acceptance of Lockean political values which ennobled the individual and 
emphasized democracy and capitalism (Hartz, 55). The chief proponent of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Eleanor Roosevelt, successfully excluded 
minority rights (Sigler 1983: 67, 77). Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles argued 
“...in the kind of world for which we fight, there must cease to exist any need for the use 
of that accursed term ‘racial or religious minority’” (May 1943, quoted in Claude 1955: 
74-75).  
                     
9 The Austrian State Treaty of 1955 offered special protections for the Slovene and Croat 
minorities. In specific areas each was guaranteed elementary school instruction in its own 
language. Slovene or Croatian would be accepted as an official language along with German. 
The two groups were to participate in the cultural, administrative, and judicial systems on an 
equal terms with Austrian nationals (Laponce 1960, 37). Each of the 1947 peace treaties 
stipulated equal rights for all citizens. Hungary and Romania, during whose fascist interludes 
the Holocaust had been particularly abominable, were instructed to compensate victims of 
racial persecution but only if claims were presented within 6 months of the treaty coming into 
force (articles 27 and 25 respectively). The Eastern European peace treaties, eclipsed by 
Cold War politics, soon became dead letters. 
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Soviet leaders eschewed international minority-rights guarantees for different reasons. 
Presiding over a realm of astonishing ethnic diversity with a history of national 
demands for autonomy, Moscow had much at risk from granting minority-group leaders 
a voice on the international stage. Soviet nationalities policy fused socialist 
internationalism, Leninist self-determination (in which cultural and national groups were 
granted formal autonomy), and the exigencies of Stalinist centralism. Although many 
minorities benefited relative to the risks of domination by the local majority, party rule 
and Soviet military hegemony effectively suppressed ethno-national political 
movements. 
Due in large part to the opposition of the US and Latin-American states, minorities were 
not mentioned in the UN Charter, and received only limited mention in the Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.10 Although minority issues gained some attention within 
specialized UN organs, most notably UNESCO and the ECOSOC Sub-Commission on 
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, this activity was of limited 
consequence until the late 1980s. Instead, post-war democratic leaders sought to 
institutionalize the rights of individuals in regional and international conventions, most 
notably through the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) and the European Court and Commission of Human 
Rights which enforce it among member states. 
Minority rights were the subject of agreements only in a small number of bilateral 
accords. In 1946 the occupied Italian and Austrian governments reached a bilateral 
understanding on regional autonomy and minority rights for German-speakers who 
were a majority in the in the South Tyrol / Alto Adige, a region granted to Italy after 
W.W.I, and who had been subject to repression by Mussolini's fascist regime. Although 
autonomy and some language rights were granted in 1948, authority remained in the 
hands of Rome and the larger Trentino-Bolzano province in which German-speakers 
were still a minority. Italian-speakers remained overwhelmingly dominant in the industry 
and administration of areas which were predominantly German-speaking. Only 
bombing campaigns by minority extremists and renewed pressure from Austrian 
leaders (having regained formal sovereignty in 1955) led Italian governments to 
renegotiate autonomy, resulting in a gradual reduction of tensions since the late 1960s 
(Alcock 1970; Hailbronner 1992: 126-127; Woodward 1995: 475, n. 17).  
The London Treaty of October 1954 which divided Trieste (administered as the Free 
Territory of Trieste from 1947 to 1954) between Italy and Yugoslavia stipulated equality 
between Italians and Yugoslavs in Trieste. Special schools, which could not be closed 
without the approval of a mixed Italian-Yugoslav committee, were designated to teach 
in one of the two languages. In areas where the non-state group constituted more than 
                     
10 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights meekly solicits states not to 
discriminate against “persons belonging to minorities...in those states in which ethnic, 
religious, or linguistic minorities exist” (article 27). States leaders are free to determine how 
to implement the clause, or indeed to deny that a minority is has distinct language, culture, 
or history (as many have done). 
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half the population, public documents were to be promulgated in both languages 
(Laponce 1960: 38). A second agreement concluded between Italy and Yugoslavia at 
Osimo in 1974 provided that all groups were to have equal political and economic 
rights; each was entitled to its own schools and to the use of its language in official 
communications (Hailbronner 1992: 127).  
When Britain gave up control of Cyprus, the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee between 
Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the UK provided for the protection of the minority Turkish 
Cypriotes. Each ethnic group had its own chamber in the Parliament. Turkish Cypriotes 
had to be represented at all levels of government and had veto power in many areas. 
Key constitutional provisions could not be amended at all and the amendment of some 
provisions required the approval of Turkey. Enosis or unification with Greece, the 
preferred outcome of the Greek majority on Cyprus, was in effect prohibited. If there 
were violations, the signatories were to consult but if an accord was not reached each 
reserved the right to take action aimed at re-establishing the state of affairs specified 
by the Treaty. When the Greece asserted control in 1974, Turkey used the Treaty to 
justify invasion and partition of the island (Bilder 1992: 69-70; Platias 1986: 153-57). 
In sum, as a result of the power and preferences of the rulers of the most powerful 
states, especially the United States, minority rights faded as a matter of international 
concern during much of the Cold War. 
6. Minority Rights after the Cold War 
The end of the Cold War accompanied, and in some cases caused, a resurgence of 
inter-ethnic strife. The new salience of state-minority conflicts ’the New Europe’s Old 
Issue’ (Cuthbertson and Leibowitz 1993) led to renewed efforts to promote international 
stability and by securing minority rights within existing states. 
In 1992, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Rights of 
Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious, and Linguistic Minorities, the first 
post second world war convention primary concerning the rights of minorities. At a 
regional level, minority rights issues have received most attention in Europe. The 
Conference and later Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE / 
OSCE), established at Helsinki in 1975, has been the most important venue. The 
Helsinki Final Act recognized the right of persons belonging to minorities to equality 
before the law and equal human rights (Principle VII). The CSCE was a contract 
between the Western and Soviet blocs in which the West recognized the borders of 
eastern Europe and the East recognized human-rights standards. Initially, minority 
rights were mentioned only as part of a larger bundle of conflicting principles. There 
were no provisions for enforcing the Helsinki accord. 
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Over time minority rights became more prominent especially with the end of the Cold 
War. The 1990 Copenhagen Document (reprinted in Brownlie, ed., 1992 1990: 
454-473) recognized the rights of national minorities, including the free use of their 
mother tongue in public and private and the incorporation of their history and culture 
into the school curriculum. Anti-Semitism and discrimination against the Roma were 
condemned. There were modest provisions for monitoring: signatories agreed to 
provide within four weeks a written response to inquiries from another member state. 
The 1991 Charter of Paris for a New Europe had extensive minority rights provisions 
such as the right of contact with co-ethnics in other countries. The office of the High 
Commissioner on National Minorities was established at the 1992 Helsinki summit to 
provide early warning and mediation in state-minority conflicts that could affect peace 
and stability (Bloed 1993: 95-96; Moravcsik 1994: 48-49). The OSCE has established 
on-site missions in several states experiencing severe instability, including Estonia, 
Moldova, ex-Yugoslavia, and most recently Russia (as observers and to some extent 
mediators in the Russian-Chechnyan conflict). 
Minority rights received prominent attention in European diplomacy concerning the 
break up of Yugoslavia. In December 1991, European Community foreign ministers 
made acceptance of the Carrington Plan the prerequisite for recognition of former 
Yugoslav republics. Croatia, Slovenia, Macedonia, and Bosnia formally accepted the 
Plan. The Carrington Plan stipulated that guarantees for human rights and civil liberties 
regardless of sex, race, color, language, religion, or minority status (Chapter 2). The 
Republics were to protect the rights of national and ethnic minorities elaborated in 
international conventions adopted by the United Nations, CSCE, and Council of 
Europe, and guarantee the cultural, political, and educational rights of minorities, 
establishing special regimes where they formed a local majority. A permanent Court of 
Human Rights would monitor these special areas and resolve disputes among the 
republics.11  
In January 1992, after the Community had recognized Croatia and Slovenia, the EC 
Arbitration Commission (Badinter Commission) ruled that Slovenia and Macedonia had 
met the conditions specified in the Carrington Plan (Woodward 1995: 190-191). The 
                     
11 Under the Carrington Plan, republics were to guarantee the cultural rights of minorities, 
equal participation in public affairs, and the right of each individual to choose his or her 
ethnic identity. Ethnic minorities could participate in the “government of the Republics 
concerning their affairs.” (Chapter 2.4). In areas where members of a minority formed a local 
majority, they were to be given special status including the right to show their national 
emblem, an educational system “which respects the values and needs of that group” 
(Chapter 2.5.c), a legislative body, a regional police force, and a judiciary which reflects the 
composition of the population. Such special areas were to be permanently demilitarized 
unless they were on an international border. The rights established in the convention were to 
be assured through national legislation.  
The Carrington Plan’s Court of Human Rights was to consist of magistrate nominated by 
each of the Yugoslav republics and an equal number plus one of nationals from European 
states who would be nominated by the member states of the EC. No two members were to 
be from the same republic or European state. Court decisions were to be taken by majority 
vote (Chapter 4). 
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Croatian government, pressured by the EC, also complied: in May 1992, it passed the 
Constitutional Law of Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights of National and 
Ethnic Communities or Minorities, many of whose provisions were drawn verbatim from 
the Carrington Report. The law endorses UN human rights accords, the Helsinki Final 
Act, the Paris Charter on a New Europe, and other CSCE documents related to 
minority and human rights. Article 4 commits Croatia to assist national and ethnic 
minorities to establish relations with their parent country. Special districts were 
designated where minorities were to be educated in their own language using a 
curriculum adequate to present their history, culture and science if such a wish is 
expressed (Art. 49). Representatives of minorities totaling more than 8 percent of the 
population of the whole country were entitled to proportional representation in the 
Croatian Parliament, government, and supreme judicial bodies. Those with less than 8 
percent were entitled to elect five representatives to the House of Representatives of 
the Croatian Parliament (Article 18). Issues regarding minority and human rights were 
to be decided by the Court of Human Rights which would be established by all the 
states created out of the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In the interim a provisional 
Court was to be established (as of late 1995 this had not taken place) consisting of a 
President and four members “who must possess the qualifications required for the 
appointment to high judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognized competence,” a 
verbatim appropriation of the language of the Carrington Report. The President and 
two members were to be nominated by the EU from citizens of its Members States and 
the other two members would be Croatian nationals nominated by Croatia (Art. 60).  
These elaborate minority-rights provisions for the former republics of Yugoslavia were 
adopted as a result of coercion. The would-be rulers of these new states would have 
preferred not to be encumbered by such international obligations. The commitments 
had limited domestic support. But their acceptance was a condition of recognition by 
the European Community. Recognition was an important resource for the rulers of 
these new states because it enabled them to enter into agreements, even if these 
agreements were coerced, with other states, international organizations, and private 
transnational actors. 
Finally, the end of the Cold War has also prompted a number of bilateral contractual 
arrangements. Germany and Denmark made parallel declarations regarding the 
treatment of ethnic groups within the other country stating that each minority would be 
given the right to establish schools, would enjoy proportional representation in local 
government committees, and would be able to maintain religious, cultural and 
professional ties with its home country (Hailbronner 1992: 128). Hungary has signed 
agreements with neighboring states with large Hungarian-speaking populations, as has 
Russia with successor republics of the USSR with Russian-speaking populations.  
In a few instances bilateral accords were the result of EU pressure. In the European 
Stability Pact of 1994, EU member states (led by French Premier Eduard Balladur) 
conditioned future consideration for EU membership on bilateral agreements to resolve 
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minority-disputes in Eastern Europe. Since these states (Poland, the Czech and Slovak 
republics, Hungary, and Slovenia in particular) relied critically on economic and military 
relations with the West, leaders of these states agreed to reach bilateral agreements to 
be placed under the guarantee of the OSCE. 
The end of the Cold War brought a renewal of international concerns with minority 
rights because ethnic conflict again threatened international stability and assaulted 
norms that were deeply embraced by publics particularly in western Europe and North 
America. Domestic autonomy was compromised. The United Natons Convention on 
Minorities was a convention. Bilateral agreements in Europe were contracts. The EU 
arrangements for the recognition of the successor states of Yugoslavia was the result 
of coercion. 
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7. Conclusions 
The protection of minorities is an old item on the international agenda. The most 
enduring motivation to protect minority rights has been the fear that internal strife could 
cause international instability, drawing rulers into conflicts which they would have 
preferred to avoid. The Thirty Years War in Germany was both a domestic and an 
international conflict. Ethnic antagonisms in the Balkans in the 19th century inevitably 
engaged the major powers of Europe because they each feared that their potential 
rivals would secure influence in the region at their expense. The minority-rights 
conditions imposed after 1918 were motivated by a broader vision of how stability could 
be maintained in the international system through democracy, self-determination, and 
the protection of minorities. The minority-rights provisions of the Cyprus accord were 
designed to prevent armed conflict between Greece and Turkey, and when the 
agreement was violated by Cypriote efforts to unite with Greece, Turkish troops did 
intervene. In recent years, the negative political repercussions of refugee-outflows has 
added to the interests of many rulers in containing state-minority conflict. 
Ethical commitments of rulers and their constituencies, as well as security, has also 
motivated international efforts to secure minority rights by compromising the domestic 
autonomy of states. European concern about the fate of Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire was a manifestation of commitments to co-religionists not always a pretense for 
expansion and intervention. Accusations of Turkish atrocities against Bulgarians 
increased British concerns about ethnic confict in the Balkans in the 1870s. The 
arrangements concluded at Versailles reflected not so much immediate security threats 
to the major powers as beliefs about how the world could be more safely organized 
according to democratic principles. European Union involvement in the former 
Yugoslavia was motivated by a desire to prevent new economic strife on the continent. 
Rulers have also entered into agreements with the expectation or hope of constraining 
the behavior of their successors who might have different views about how they should 
treat their own subjects. Many of these commitments, however, especially those with 
limited domestic support in signatory countries, have done little to alter the harsh 
treatment of minorities.  
Minority-rights agreements have had some success, most notably the development of 
religious toleration in northwestern Europe from the 16th to the 19th centuries. (The 
Holocaust, however, painfully demonstrated how incomplete this accomplishment was.) 
This was largely the result of developments within polities, but these domestic changes 
were reinforced by international agreements affirming limited toleration. These 
agreements were Pareto-improving and mutually contingent: rulers in one country 
adhered to their commitments to religious toleration at least in part because they feared 
that violations could precipitate retaliation against co-religionists in other countries and, 
in some cases, war. Where rulers feared the disorder of religious strife more than they 
desired religious uniformity, international agreements could provide an equilibrium 
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solution in which all parties adhered because defection would leave everyone worse 
off. 
Efforts to achieve religious toleration and minority rights through coercion and 
imposition have usually failed. In the Balkans in the 19th century, after the first world 
war, and in Yugoslavia after 1991, major powers made the acceptance of minority 
rights a condition of international recognition. In almost all of these cases the rulers or 
would-be rulers of the target states would have preferred to maintain their own 
autonomy, but were too weak to resist. Once recognition was accorded, however, the 
initiators had lost their major source of leverage. Even if the rulers of more powerful 
states had no compunction about violating the domestic autonomy of their counterparts 
in weaker states, withdrawing recognition was problematic because local interlocutors, 
recognized rulers, usually provided the most convenient mechanism through which the 
powerful could pursue their interests or values. In many cases, such as Treaty of Berlin 
of 1878, monitoring provisions were limited or non-existent. As rulers forced to accept 
minority-rights regimes gained resources, they were able to avoid, ignore, or abrogate 
their commitments. 
Principles in the international environment, such as as non-intervention in the internal 
affairs of other states can serve as reference points, widely available cognitive images 
of possible modes of human behavior, but are not taken for granted. Rulers have 
always been able to conceive of alternatives to the Westphalian model and have 
frequently acted on these conceptions. International principles are not focal points that 
can resolve collective action problems because powerful actors can ignore or arbitrarily 
challenge one set of principles by offering alternative, often contradictory ones in their 
stead. Virtually every major peace settlement has included not just different norms but 
logically inconsistent ones. 
Rules and norms in the international environment are plural, contested, and determined 
by the material interests, values and power of actors, especially the rulers of the most 
powerful states. Non-intervention, a defining principle of the Westphalian model, has 
been persistently challenged by alternatives such as the protection of minorities. There 
has never been a general consensus among rulers on which principles were to prevail. 
Weak states have argued for the inviolability of the rule of non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of other states. Major powers have maintained that international stability, 
or the need to protect minorities, or the importance of democracy, can trump autonomy. 
Given that the international environment is anarchic, nothing prevents rulers from 
voluntarily ceding their future autonomy, or rulers in more powerful states from coercing 
or imposing their preferences on those in weaker ones. 
The status of minorities, and relations between rulers and ruled more generally, are 
always subject to challenge by external actors motivated by ethnic or other affinity, the 
goal of international stability, or more broader values such as democracy and religious 
toleration. If a state is strong enough, as has always been the case for the United 
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States, it can ignore such challenges. In the case of weak states, as in the Balkans for 
most of the 19th and 20th centuries, rulers must engage in contracting or submit to 
coercion. The ability of the strong to coerce or impose successfully, or of rulers within 
states to bind their successors through international commitments, depends upon 
domestic political values and commitments. Without a base of domestic support, 
international efforts to assure minority rights will almost certainly fail because the 
resources available to the initiators weaken over time. In which cases and to what 
extent Westphalian toleration can prevail over Westphalian sovereignty will depend 
less on competing principles of international law than on the interests and capabilities 
of the actors concerned. 
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